While there exists numerous studies on the macroeconomic eects of oil and commodity shocks, the literature is quite silent on the impact of macroeconomic uncertainty on oil and commodity prices and, especially, on their volatility. This paper tackles this issue through the estimation of a structural threshold vector autoregressive (TVAR) model on a sample of 19 commodity markets. We aim at (i) assessing whether the eect of macroeconomic uncertainty shocks on commodity price returns depends on the degree of uncertainty, and (ii) investigating the transfer from macroeconomic uncertainty to price uncertainty using a newly developed measure of commodity price uncertainty. Our ndings show that both agricultural and industrial markets are highly sensitive to the variability and the level of macroeconomic uncertainty, while the impact on precious metals is more parsimonious given their well-identied safe-haven role in time of economic turmoil. In addition, we nd evidence that the recent 2007-09 recession has generated an unprecedented episode of high uncertainty in numerous commodity prices. Interestingly, our analysis further reveals that volatility and uncertainty in prices can be disconnected. This is especially true for the oil market as most important shocks in the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s that lead to price volatility do not generate price uncertainty, highlighting the relevance of our uncertainty measure in linking uncertainty to predictability rather than to volatility. JEL Classication: Q02, E32, C32.
Introduction
The literature on oil and commodity markets during the last decade has shown the importance to identify and understand the causes and consequences of commodity price shocks. Some of the key insights (Kilian, 2008a) are that (i) most commodity prices are endogenous with respect to the global business cycle, and (ii) demand shocks cause delayed and sustained price movements while supply shocks have small and transitory eects. Whereas disentangling the supply and demand components in a structural model is now common in the empirical literature to understand commodity price dynamics (especially for crude oil price), some important concerns are missing regarding the eect of second-order moments (especially the one related to uncertainty).
So far, the previous literature is indeed silent on the eects of macroeconomic uncertainty on the volatility of commodity prices. This issue is nevertheless worthy of investigation since the impact of uncertainty on the global economy has been widely documented. For instance, theories of investment under uncertainty explain why under irreversibility condition or xed costs, uncertainty over future returns reduces current investment, hiring, and consumption through an option value to wait.
1 The starting point is that at a micro level, uncertainty may diminish the willingness of rms to commit resources to irreversible investment and the readiness of consumers to spend or allocate their earning and wages. It follows that micro-level uncertainty may be transmitted to the macro level because uncertainty about the return to investment at a micro level may create cyclical uctuations in aggregate investment at a macro level (see Bernanke, 1983 ).
2 The crucial point here is that there is no reason why such mechanism at both micro and macro levels should not be extended to commodity markets. Indeed, at a micro level, commodity rms in several sectors (especially in oil industry) are confronted to high costs and should be impacted by uncertainty about returns to investment. Similarly, at a macro level, as prices are related to global supply and demand conditions, uncertainty about macroeconomic aggregates should also aect commodity prices.
In the wake of the literature about the origins of commodity price movements, the aim of this paper is to investigate the impact of uncertainty on commodity price returns and volatility. Regarding the previous literature, the bulk of the studies have looked at the reverse relationship and highlighted the signicance of uncertainty in oil prices in explaining economic uctuations and in exacerbating asymmetry in the oil price-economic activity nexus.
3 All of them suggest that oil price uncertainty impacts output, investment, and consumption in the U.S. and G-7 countries in an asymmetric way. While providing interesting results, these studies suer from 1 See Bernanke (1983) , Gibson and Schwartz (1990) , Bloom et al. (2007) , and Bloom (2009) 2 This could be due to two reasons: (i) the macroeconomy is insuciently diversied and cannot be protected from micro-level uctuations; and (ii) under imperfect information, agents may confound transitory and permanent shocks, thereby converting a transitory shock into a persistent shock.
3 See Kilian (2014) for a review. The reader may also refer to the theoretical papers of Bernanke (1983) and Pindyck (1991) , and to the empirical studies of Elder and Serletis (2010) and Jo (2014) to name few. Note that, as underlined by Kilian (2014) , Elder and Serletis do not directly test for symmetry in the eect of oil prices, but rather test the null of no feedback eect from the conditional variance of oil prices to the conditional mean.
A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
an important drawback since it is well known that the eect of uncertainty in the oil priceand commodity prices in generalon the macroeconomy should be small, by construction of the underlying economic models. As argued by Kilian (2014) , energy is indeed not necessarily a key component of the cash ow of investment projects, making the eect of oil price uncertainty on output not plausible. It follows that looking at the reverse transmission from macroeconomic uncertainty to the volatility of commodity prices is more relevant with regard to the modern view of the endogenous component of prices. As stressed above, this question has not been widely addressed in the literature. Some limited exceptions can, however, be mentioned.
First, regarding theoretical papers, (i) Pindyck (1980) discusses the implications of uncertainty associated with oil demand and reserves on the oil price behavior; (ii) Litzenberger and Rabinowitz (1995) analyze backwardation behavior in oil futures contracts; and (iii) Alquist and Kilian (2010) allow for endogenous convenience yield and endogenous inventories, and stress that it is uncertainty about the shortfall of supply relative to demand that matters. Second, among empirical papers, one may refer to (i) Kilian (2009) and Kilian and Murphy (2014) who design as a precautionary demand shock a shock that reects shifts in uncertainty and treat macroeconomic uncertainty as unobserved; and (ii) Van Robays (2013) who investigates whether observed macroeconomic uncertainty changes the responsiveness of the oil price to shocks in oil demand and supply.
Our paper extends this literature on the relationship between macroeconomic uncertainty and commodity prices in several ways. Specically, we address this question by examining the inuence of macroeconomic uncertainty on a large panel of commodity markets. More precisely,
we consider four groups of 19 raw materials (energy, precious metals, agriculture, and industry)
to investigate whether the impact of macroeconomic uncertainty on commodity prices diers depending on the type of market. In addition, with uncertainty evolving through time, we account for this feature by assessing its impact at various horizonsnamely short-, medium-, and long-run horizonsto test whether its eect varies according to its maturity. From a theoretical viewpoint, uctuations in uncertainty may indeed have dierent impacts through time on the economy (Bloom, 2014) , with usually two negative channels in the short run (the real option and risk aversion/risk premium eects 4 ) and two positive channels in the long run (the growth option and Oi-Hartman-Abel eects 5 ). 6 Turning to methodological issues, our contribution is threefold. First, we retain a nonlinear structural threshold vector autoregressive (TVAR) specication that allows us to identify dierent uncertainty states, and we investigate whether the impact of uncertainty varies according to its level and variability. Second, because 4 The real option hypothesis refers to an option value to wait and suggests that uncertainty encourages rms to become cautious about adjustment costs. The risk aversion/risk premium eect refers to the cost of nance, which may increase in times of greater uncertainty.
5 See Bloom (2014) for a review of the related literature. The growth option argument is based on the idea that uncertainty can encourage investment and R&D if it increases the size of the potential prize. The OiHartman-Abel eect refers to the fact that rms can expand to exploit good outcomes and contract to insure against bad outcomes, diminishing the potential impact of uncertainty.
6 Note that we do not explicitly investigate the channels through which uncertainty impacts commodity marketsa question that we leave for future researchbut examine whether this impact may dier across levels of maturity.
macroeconomic uncertainty is unobservable, assessing its eect on commodity markets obviously requires us to nd an adequate proxy. To this end, we rely on Jurado et al. (2015) and consider a robust approach to measuring macroeconomic uncertainty. The retained proxy uses a wide range of monthly macroeconomic and nancial indicators and is based on the underlying idea of a link between uncertainty and predictability. In this sense, we go further than the previous literatureparticularly compared with Van Robays (2013)'s paper, which is the closest to ourswhich generally relies on dispersion measures such as conditional volatility (e.g.
conditional variance of world industrial production growth or of U.S. GDP growth estimated from a GARCH(1,1) process) or the VXO index of Bloom (2009). As we will see, an important drawback in using GARCH-type models to proxy uncertainty is that they are inherently backward-looking, whereas investors' expectations tend to be forward-looking. More generally, and thanks to a detailed robustness analysis, we show that the choice of the uncertainty measure is crucial to avoid erroneously attributing to uncertainty uctuations that are actually predictable. Third, for the sake of completeness, we also investigate how macroeconomic uncertainty can generate uncertainty in commodity prices, looking at second-order moments transfer. To this end, we construct a robust proxy of commodity market uncertainty based on macroeconomic uncertainty, and provide a historical decomposition that allows us to determine the contribution of macroeconomic uncertainty to commodity price uncertainty. For the specic case of oil, we further disentangle supply and demand components of oil price uncertainty to assess their respective contribution during periods of uncertainty in the market.
The central message of the paper is that most of commodity price returns are aected by macroeconomic uncertainty, the eect being more important for commodities that are strongly related to the global business cycle (such as oil, agricultural, and industrial markets). Then, in addition to traditional supply and demand shocks, macroeconomic uncertainty constitutes another key channel through which economic fundamentals may impact commodity prices. Maturity seems to matter depending on the commodity type; long-run uncertainty having more eect on agricultural and industrial cumulative price dynamics, while other markets being more sensitive to short-run impacts. Furthermore, our new commodity price uncertainty indicator shows for most considered series a transfer from macroeconomic uncertainty to price uncertainty during the 2007-09 great recession period. It further reveals that volatility and uncertainty in prices are disconnected. It is especially the case for oil as we nd that most important shocks that occurred in the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s that lead to price volatility do not generate systematic price uncertainty, meaning that most of these movements were predictable at this period and emphasizing the relevance of our uncertainty measure in linking uncertainty to predictability rather than to volatility.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the uncertainty measure and discusses the corresponding theoretical framework. Section 3 addresses methodological issues by presenting the TVAR specication as well as our data. Section 4 displays the results regarding the impact of macroeconomic uncertainty on commodity markets. Section 5 is devoted to the link between macroeconomic uncertainty and the uncertainty of each commodity market, and
disentangles the respective contribution of supply and demand shocks to oil price uncertainty.
Section 6 provides some robustness checks regarding the choice of both the macroeconomic uncertainty measure and our measure of price uncertainty. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Uncertainty measure
Measuring macroeconomic uncertainty
Measuring uncertainty and examining its impact on market dynamics is a challenging question for economists because no objective measure exists. Although in a general sense uncertainty is dened as the conditional volatility of an unforecastable disturbance, 7 the empirical literature to date has usually relied on proxies. The most common measures used are the implied or realized volatility of stock market returns, the cross-sectional dispersion of rm prots, stock returns, or productivity, and the cross-sectional dispersion of survey-based forecasts. However, their adequacy to correctly proxy uncertainty is questionable, and such measures are even misspecied with regard to the theoretical notion of uncertainty, as highlighted by Jurado et al.
(2015). Indeed, stock market volatility, cross-sectional dispersion in stock returns and rm prots can vary over time due to several factorssuch as risk aversion, the leverage eect, and heterogeneity between rmseven if there is no signicant change in uncertainty. In other words, uctuations that are actually predictable can be erroneously attributed to uncertainty, putting forward the importance of distinguishing between uncertainty in a series and its conditional volatility. Specically, properly measuring uncertainty requires to remove the forecastable component of the considered series before computing the conditional volatility. In this sense, uncertainty in a series is not equivalent to the conditional volatility of the raw series. Another important characteristic of Jurado et al. (2015) 's approach is that macroeconomic uncertainty is dened as the common variation in uncertainty across many series rather than uncertainty related to any single series. This is in line with the uncertainty-based business cycle theories which implicitly assume a common variation in uncertainty across a large number of series.
Accordingly, to provide a consistent measure of macroeconomic uncertainty, we follow the denition of Jurado et al. (2015) by linking uncertainty to predictability. Specically, the hperiod-ahead uncertainty in the variable y jt ∈ Y t = y 1t , ..., y Nyt is dened as the conditional volatility U y jt (h) of the purely unforecastable component of the future value of the series:
where j = 1, ..., N y , E (. |J t ) is the conditional expectation of the considered variable and J t denotes the information set available at time t. Uncertainty related to the variable y jt+h is therefore dened as the expectation of the squared error forecast. Aggregating over j individ- 
As discussed by Jurado et al. (2015) , the estimation of Equations (1) and (2) To do so, an as rich as possible predictive model based on factors from a large set of N predictors {X it }, i = 1, ..., N , is considered, taking the following approximated form:
where F t is a r f × 1 vector of latent common factors, Λ F i is the vector of latent factor loadings, and e X it is a vector of idiosyncratic errors which allows for some cross-sectional correlations. To 10 Dealing with monthly data and focusing on macroeconomic uncertainty, we consider in this paper the common macroeconomic uncertainty measure.
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Endogenous and exogenous components of uncertainty
One important issue when investigating the impact of macroeconomic uncertainty on commodity prices is to understand the intrinsic nature of uncertainty with respect to prices. In other words, it is important to disentangle the endogenous and exogenous components of macroeconomic uncertainty (i.e., whether macroeconomic uncertainty is demand-driven or supplydriven with respect to commodity prices). Since 1974, the price of oilas the price of other commoditieshas become endogenous with respect to global macroeconomic conditions (see Alquist et al., 2013) . Since then, the empirical literature has provided overwhelming evidence that commodity prices have been driven by global demand shocks. The underlying idea is that anyone who expects the price to increase in the future will be prompted to store oil now for future use leading to a shock from the demand of oil inventories. 
12
The aggregate specication of our proxy has the particularity to be global, accounting for a lot of information regarding uncertainty in the supply and demand channels. While it is quite dicult in this framework to identify the proportion of unanticipated demand or supply, some reasonable assumptions about the eect of demand and supply shocks on prices may
give us some insight about the mechanisms behind the relationship between macroeconomic uncertainty and commodity prices. In our analysis, we follow the dominant view about the endogenous nature of commodity prices with respect to macroeconomic conditions, considering the aggregate demand channel as a primary source of price uctuations (see Mabro, 1998; Kilian, 2002, 2004; Kilian, 2008a; and Hamilton, 2009 ). In line with the previous literature, we therefore assume that exogenous events coming from the supply channelsuch as cartel decisions, oil embargoes or the eects of political uncertainty from the Middle Eastare secondary, being mainly an indirect consequence of the macroeconomic environment. By construction, our approach accounts for both channels, the demand channel being a direct eect of macroeconomic aggregate and the supply channel an indirect eect of macroeconomic conditions on exogenous events. In other words, our macroeconomic uncertainty proxy primarily reects uncertainty about the demand side.
13
11 One exception for the case of oil is the 1990s, where the ow supply shocks have played an important role (see Kilian and Murphy, 2014) .
12 This shock is also often called speculative demand shock since it involves a forward-looking strategy (see Kilian and Murphy, 2014 ).
13 Recall that assuming small eects for supply disruptions does not mean that exogenous political events do not matter. Indeed, they also aect prices by shifting expectations about future shortfalls of supply relative to A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T
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2.3 Backward-looking vs. forward-looking uncertainty
As previously discussed, it is quite dicult to approximate uncertainty because it is not observable. One important issue regarding usual proxies based on conditional volatility is that they are often backward-looking, whereas investors' expectations tend to be forward-looking (Kilian and Vigfusson, 2011) . As an illustrative purpose, Figure 1 
15
The concept of uncertainty is basically related to the perception of agents about potential future evolutions. Together with the notion of time variability, it implies that dierent horizons lead to distinct perceptions of uncertainty, and thus disparate economic behaviors. As shown by Jurado et al. (2015) , uncertainty is generally higher for medium-and long-run maturities (respectively 3 and 12 months) than for short-run horizons (1 month). In addition, the relative importance of macroeconomic uncertainty in the total uncertainty (i.e., uncertainty accounting for all series) grows as the forecast horizon increases. Accounting for the maturity is thus of great importance to fully apprehend the impact of uncertainty on macroeconomic dynamics.
As shown by Jurado et al. (2015) , uncertainty shocks with shorter uncertainty horizons tend to be associated with a larger fraction of the forecast error variance in aggregates than those demand (see Kilian, 2009 ; and Alquist and Kilian, 2010).
14 We focus on this series rather than on the world industrial production growth because it is designed to reect the overall uncertainty of the macroeconomic environment (see Van Robays, 2013) .
15 See Figure with longer uncertainty horizons.
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In the context of commodity prices and especially oil prices, the discussion is of primary importance. The ongoing debate in the literature about the eect of maturity has been mainly oriented toward the consequences of oil price uncertainty on economic activity. Kilian and Vigfusson (2011) provide an interesting comparison between the long-run theoretical uncertainty measure of Bernanke (1983) and Pindyck (1991) , and the empirical short-run uncertainty proxy of Elder and Serletis (2010). According to the authors, the former denition is related to uncertainty at horizons relevant to investment decisions, while the latter is more appropriate to capture the reallocation eect of Hamilton (1988) since it measures the current real oil price volatility. Clearly, the eect of oil price uncertainty on activity depends on the impact of the oil price on investment, but also on how companies face to uncertainty regarding their investment decision plans. Indeed, depending on the sectors, the delay from the investment decision to the beginning of the production can dier, and short-run uncertainty can thus have no impact for long-run investment strategies. All in all, accounting for the eect of maturity when investigating the impact of uncertainty is thus of crucial importance.
3 Data and model specication
Data
We consider a large dataset of 19 principal commodity markets, classied into four categories:
energy, precious metals, agriculture, and industry. Related price series are monthly, starting 16 More precisely, the authors show that when h = 1, common macroeconomic uncertainty shocks account for between 3.59% and 15.13% of the forecast error variance in industrial production, compared to 0.52% and 10.56% for h = 12. For a review on the eects of maturity on uncertainty, see Bloom (2014) .
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in October 1978 for energy markets, February 1976 for precious metals markets, and February 1980 for agricultural and industrial markets. The period ends in April 2015 for all groups of commodities. All series are transformed into rst-logarithmic dierences (i.e., price returns),
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as described in Table 1 in Appendix A, which also provides data sources.
Turning to macroeconomic uncertainty measures for distinct maturities, we rely on data freely available on Ludvigson's homepage. 20 In constructing the factors (see Equation (3)), the raw data have been transformed to achieve stationarity. Finally, it is worth mentioning that whereas both sets of data are used to estimate the forecasting factors, macroeconomic uncertainty is proxied using the 
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Finally, an appealing characteristic is that our retained uncertainty measures have the advantage of providing far fewer important uncertainty episodes than do popular proxies. As an example, though Bloom (2009) Overall, our considered macroeconomic uncertainty proxy identies fewer uncertainty episodes than usual volatility-based measures, but when such periods occur, they display higher and more persistent correlation with real activity. These developments highlight the relevance of considering predictability rather than volatility when assessing the uncertainty -macroeconomy relationship.
Structural threshold VAR model
To analyze whether uncertainty aects commodity prices' behavior depending on the level of uncertainty, we consider that uncertainty may be a nonlinear propagator of shocks across markets, captured by a structural threshold vector autoregressive model.
A threshold VAR model
is a nonlinear multivariate system of equations that models nonlinearity additively and can be estimated by OLS. In addition to providing an intuitive way to capture the nonlinear eects of uncertainty on markets, the TVAR model has the advantage of endogenously identifying different uncertainty states. Indeed, according to this specication, observations can be divided, for example, into two states delimited by a threshold reached by uncertainty, with estimated coecients that vary depending on the considered state (low-and high-uncertainty states). In other words, the TVAR specication allows uncertainty states to switch as a result of shocks to commodity markets.
For each of our four groups of commodity markets, we consider a structural TVAR model of the form:
21 See Balke (2000), Tong (2010) , and Hansen (2011) for more details on these models. It is important to note that nonlinearities may arise in many dierent forms. So far, empirical papers on the energy prices-economic activity nexus have mainly focused on asymmetric specications (see e.g. Hamilton, 1996; Kilian and Vigfusson, 2011; Venditti, 2013). Our main purpose in this paper is to investigate whether the eect of macroeconomic uncertainty on commodity price returns depends on the regime of uncertainty, justifying the use of a threshold specication. 
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24 The level of trimming is 15% as it is common in the literature.
forecasting horizon). Unlike the standard framework, in our case the reaction of the endogenous variable to a shock depends on the past history, the state of the economy and the size and the sign of all the shocks hitting the economy within the period of interest. In order to average out the inuences of shocks on the system, we compute generalized impulse-response functions (GIRFs, see Koop et al., 1996) . By relying on data simulation depending on the regime of the system at the time of the shock hits the variables, this approach has the advantage to allow for regime-dependent responses, as well as to look at the eects of shocks of dierent sizes and directions.
A GIRF can be dened by the following expression:
where Ω t−1 is the information set at time t − 1 and u t is a particular realization of exogenous shocks. The response of the variable y at horizon h is calculated by simulating the evolution of the model conditionally on the initial condition Ω t−1 and a given realization of u t . The general idea is to simulate the model for any possible starting point in the time horizon. We do this by drawing vectors of shocks u t+j with j = 1, ..., k, and simulating the model conditionally on the initial condition and given realization. We repeat the procedure for −u t+j in order to eliminate any asymmetry that may arise from sampling variation in the draws of u t+j . The approach is repeated 500 times. In order to generate IRFs conditionally to the location of the system with respect to the threshold variable, the simulations are repeated for several histories depending on the considered regime. Finally, the response to shocks specic to a particular regime is the estimated conditional expectation based upon the average of the simulation results. 25 3.3 Endogeneity and strict exogeneity between macroeconomic and commodity prices
As mentioned above, another complication when estimating TVAR models concerns the endogeneity issue. Endogeneity may come from the fact that the threshold variable (our uncertainty measure) is allowed to endogenously respond to commodity price shocks. One way to address this problem is to assume strict exogeneity between variables. However, as discussed by Van Robays (2013) among others, assuming strict exogeneity between oil prices (and commodity prices in general) and macroeconomic uncertainty is not realistic because it is well known that a strong relationship exists between the oil market and economic activity. Therefore, a common approach is to impose the threshold variable to switch across states with a delay. This implies that we only evaluate commodity price shocks that occur within a certain state. Another common assumption in the TVAR literature is to dene the threshold variable as a moving average process that requires some persistence in the variation of the threshold variable before shocks cause the regime switching. To fully address the issue of endogeneity, we combine 25 The algorithm used to derive the GIRFs is described in Appendix A.
these two approaches in the present paper by considering a three-period moving average of our one-period-lagged threshold variable.
4 Uncertainty transmission across states
We now use the TVAR approach to apprehend the impact of macroeconomic uncertainty on commodity prices. We rst present threshold test results and related comments. We then complement the analysis by conducting nonlinear IRF analysis under high-and low-uncertainty states to investigate whether the transmission of macroeconomic uncertainty shocks into commodity markets diers across states. Finally, we assess the inuence of the considered maturity. Tables 2 to 5 in Appendix A report the three threshold test results for each group of commodity markets at dierent maturities together with the percentage of high uncertainty corresponding to the percentage of observations such that the threshold variable is above the estimated threshold critical value.
Threshold test results
27 Our main results can be summarized as follows.
First, the null hypothesis is always rejected in favor of the presence of threshold eects for each group of markets and the maturity considered. The TVAR specication is thus appropriate because it accounts for varying eects of uncertainty depending on the degree of uncertainty.
Second, the estimated threshold values increase with the maturity, meaning that as h increases, the switching mechanism between low-and high-uncertainty states is delayed. This nding reects a dierent perception of the level of uncertainty as the horizon increases (Bloom, 2014) and is also consistent with Jurado et al. Recall that the proxy is countercyclical meaning that increases in uncertainty correspond to recessionary periods. Therefore, for gold and silver prices two eects seem to be at play: (i) macroeconomic uncertainty decreases the general price level since the economy is in recession, and (ii) after a certain delay, the safe-haven role of precious metals leads to rapid strong overshooting behaviors. The main drivers of oil and platinum markets are sensitive to macroeconomic uncertainty shocks because they are strongly related to economic activity through industry purposes. A dierent pattern is observed for the gas market, for which the response to macroeconomic uncertainty shocks is more important in low-uncertainty states.
The regional organization of this market may explain its relatively weak sensitivity to high macroeconomic uncertainty. Turning to the industrial and agricultural sectors, all industrial markets but the zinc follow quite similar patterns signicantly reacting to uncertainty, as do agricultural markets with the exception of coeewhich is a highly volatile marketand, to a lesser extent, sugar and wheat.
Does maturity matter?
Examining the inuence of maturity when investigating the impact of uncertainty on prices is of particular importance given the multiple channels and dierent eects at play at short-, medium-, and long-run horizons (see Bloom, 2014 , for a review). Understanding the maturity perception in assessing uncertainty is also of primary importance for commodity prices since maturity may capture dierent behaviors. For instance, short-and medium-run uncertainty may capture a kind of reallocation eect (Hamilton, 1988 ) since such maturities focus on current behaviors, while a long-run perception of uncertainty may be more related to Bernanke (1983)'s framework because it corresponds to horizons relevant to purchase and investment decisions.
28
Our results in Section 4.1 give us a rst insight about the static sensitivity of prices to maturity.
28 Recall that, by construction, the level and the variability of our proxy of uncertainty respectively increases and decreases with h. This property allows us to apprehend the sensitivity of commodity prices to both the level and the variability of uncertainty.
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Turning now to the dynamic analysis, Figure 1D in Appendix D reports the average (per group of markets) cumulative responses of prices to positive high uncertainty two-standard deviations shocks at maturity h. As before, three values of h are considerednamely, 1, 3 and 12 months. The results are consistent with those of Section 4.1 revealing that maturity matters for some markets. Though the percentage of high uncertainty is quite stable across maturity for energy and precious metals markets, the responses of both groups to a positive shock are quite similar giving more importance to the short-run eect. While the impact of short-run uncertainty is clear for energy markets (in line with the close relationship that exists between energy and economic activity in the short run), the response of precious metals markets seems to be more sensitive to long-run uncertainty after a certain delay.
29 The specic behavior of precious metals markets may come from the well-known safe-haven property transferring uncertainty at 1 month to longer horizons (12 months). For industrial markets the conclusion is more straightforward, uncertainty at longer maturity (h = 12) has a greater immediate impact on price returns, conrming the high sensitivity of such markets to structural factors and the reactiveness of industrial rms to horizons relevant to long-run investments. Regarding the agricultural sector, markets also appear to be more sensitive to long-run uncertainty, which is quite logical since agricultural rms may face longer horizons with respect to agricultural investment decisions. On the whole, the important point regarding the impact on commodity prices is not only the percentage of high uncertainty but also how shocks are incorporated into the system and, in turn, their implications for economic behaviors.
5 Does macroeconomic uncertainty generate commodity uncertainty?
To provide a complete description of the links between macroeconomic uncertainty and commodity markets, we go a step further and investigate how macroeconomic uncertainty can aect each commodity market uncertainty. To this end, we must dene an uncertainty measure for each market and then assess the transmission mechanism of macroeconomic uncertainty to each specic commodity market uncertainty.
Measuring commodity market uncertainty
Let us rst consider the determination of the commodity market uncertainty proxy. We rely on Equation (1) and proceed in two steps. In a rst step, we use the previously estimated TVAR model to generate the h-period-ahead forecast of the considered price return series, accounting 29 Given the importance of the oil market in the literature, Figure 2D in Appendix D reports the specic response of the oil price to positive (left side) and negative (right side) macroeconomic shocks across maturity.
As for the whole energy markets group, the oil price is more sensitive to short-run uncertainty after a positive shock. Looking at negative shocks (i.e., decrease in macroeconomic uncertainty), the response is quite symmetric to the positive one, highlighting the importance of short-run uncertainty.
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for the information about macroeconomic uncertainty. Let E [y t+h /J t , u u t ] be the obtained forecast, where y is the considered commodity price return series, J t the information set available at time t, and u u t the macroeconomic uncertainty shock at time t. As seen, our forecast value accounts for information about macroeconomic uncertainty. Given this forecast, we dene in a second step the h-period-ahead forecast error as the dierence between y t+h and E [y t+h /J t , u u t ], the forecast that accounts for information about macroeconomic uncertainty. The underlying idea is that a way to understand the transmission mechanism of macroeconomic uncertainty to commodity markets is to assess how the forecast of our considered variable changes if we add information about macroeconomic uncertainty. The commodity market uncertainty measure is then given by the volatility of this forecast error.
To account for the volatility-clustering phenomenon, which is a typical feature of commodity markets, we rely on time-varying volatility specications and consider the moving average given by:
where x t denotes the forecast error, i.e., the dierence between the forecast of y that does not account for information about macroeconomic uncertainty and the forecast that accounts for such information. The error term v t is assumed to be serially dependent, following a MA(q) process of the form:
where ε t ∼ N 0, e ht and ζ t ∼ N 0, σ 2 h are independent of each other, ε 0 = ε −1 = ... = ε −q+1 = 0, and the roots of the polynomial associated with the MA coecients ψ = (ψ 1 , ..., ψ q ) are assumed to be outside the unit circle. h t is the log-volatility evolving as a stationary AR (1) process. Following Chan and Hsiao (2013), under the moving average extension, the conditional variance of the series x t is given by:
This specication allows us to capture two nonlinear channels of macroeconomic uncertainty:
(i) the one coming from the moving average of the q + 1 most recent variances e ht + ... + e ht−q , and (ii) the other from the AR(1) log-volatility stationary process given by Equation (8) .
Given the challenge of estimating this kind of nonlinear model due to high-dimensional and nonstandard datawith the conditional density of the states being non-Gaussiana Bayesian 30 For robustness checks, the GARCH, standard stochastic, and heavy-tailed stochastic volatility models have also been considered to estimate the volatility of forecast errors. The corresponding results, available upon request to the authors, are quite similar between models.
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Hsiao (2013) 32 Otherwise, uncertainty is attributable to the own characteristics of the considered raw materials market.
Consider rst the case of energy markets. As shown in Figure 1E (Appendix E), the sensi- 36 At the beginning of the 1980s, the strategy of Saudi Arabia to shut down production (compensating higher oil production elsewhere in the world) was initiated to prevent an oil price decline, without success. Saudi
Arabia nally decided to ramp production back up in 1986, causing an oil shock from $27/barrel in 1985 to $12/barrel in 1986 (see Kilian and Murphy, 2014 ).
37 One reason is that exogenous shocks that often cause recessionssuch as wars or nancial panicsalso directly increase uncertainty (see Bloom, 2014) .
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largely anticipated because the related uncertainty remained relatively low. In other words, macroeconomic uncertainty did not spread to precious metals markets. This nding conrms the safe-heaven role of gold and silver given that macroeconomic uncertainty surrounding the global crisis pushed up their prices, but did not induce uncertainty in their respective markets.
However, at the beginning of the 1980s, the high-uncertainty period associated with gold and silver prices coincided with the 1981-82 recession. The gold market, which is often used as a hedging instrument against ination pressures, experienced huge movements in 1980 due to the continued stop-and-go monetary policy of the Fed raising its rate to 20%, then lowering it to 8%, and augmenting it again to 20%. 39 At the beginning of the 1970s, the Hunt Brothers began accumulating large amounts of silver to hedge against oil investment, totaling almost the global market by 1979 (with an estimated holdings of the one third of the entire silver world supply). This accumulation rose the price of silver from $11 per ounce at the end of 1979 to $50 per ounce in January 1980. In response to this speculative accumulation, the COMEX adopted on January 7, 1980 the Silver Rule 7 placing heavy restrictions on the purchase of this commodity. Three months after (on March 27, 1980), the silver price collapsed to below $11 per ounce. This event is known as the Silver Thursday.
40 Over the past century, the demand for rened copper has increased from 500,000 metric tons to over 19 million metric tons.
sive construction projects, infrastructure renewal, and telecommunication modications), it is usually strongly related to global economic activity, and its price is often used as an indicator of global development. Therefore, the 2007-09 period of macroeconomic uncertainty is closely related to copper price uncertainty, as shown in Figure 3E . Similar patterns are observed for the other industrial markets, which are also strongly related to global economic conditions.
The transfer of macroeconomic uncertainty to agricultural and food prices uncertainty is of primary importance given the strong economical, political and social implications for both In 1989, the coee price experienced a volatility spike after the end of the coee agreement, but this episode did not lead to uncertainty because it was largely anticipated. Another example is the cotton market, which is characterized by a strong uncertainty episode that occurred in 2011, with a huge unanticipated price increase that could be explained by a constellation of events such as gradually tightening stocks, an unexpected freeze in China's cotton producing areas, historic oods in Pakistan and a ban on exports from India.
Overall, though the results are obviously somewhat heterogeneous across markets, the recent 2007-09 recession generated an unprecedented episode of uncertainty in the price of numerous commodities, particularly oil, platinum, various agricultural commodities and, especially, all industrial raw materials. The main exception concerns uncertainty related to gold and silver prices, a fact that can be explained by their roles as safe havens and hedging instruments. An additional result is that, as clearly shown by Figures 1E to 4E in Appendix E, uncertainty episodes are not necessarily accompanied by high volatility in commodity prices.
This major nding illustrates the interest of our retained measure of uncertainty, underlining that uncertainty is more related to predictability than to volatility. The relevance of the 
predictability-based approach could be explained by some specic properties of the commodity markets. In particular, these markets are known to be characterized by a low elastic demand together with a strong inertial supply, making any unexpected adjustment dicult and costly.
Historical decomposition analysis
To assess the contribution of macroeconomic uncertainty to commodity prices uncertainty, we perform a historical decomposition analysis of each commodity market uncertainty with respect to macroeconomic uncertainty. Based on the estimation of VAR models, 42 Figure   1F in Appendix F reports the historical decomposition associated with oil and copper prices uncertainty.
43 Results in Appendix F conrm those of the previous section. Indeed, looking at the crude oil market, we nd a strong proportion of macroeconomic uncertainty in oil price uncertainty during the recent 2007-09 nancial crisis (around 35% of oil price uncertainty is explained by macroeconomic uncertainty during this period). Recalling that our proxy of macroeconomic uncertainty is demand-driven, these conclusions are in line with the literature.
During the 1986-87 episode, oil price uncertainty is not explained by macroeconomic uncertainty and the proportion of macroeconomic uncertainty appears to be negative. This suggests that other shocks not related to economic activity have been at play during this period. Turning to the copper price, we also nd a transfer from macroeconomic uncertainty to price uncertainty, the share of macroeconomic uncertainty being around 12% during the recent nancial turmoil.
Overall, these results show that a signicant component of price uncertainty can be explained by macroeconomic uncertainty. A key nding is that the recent oil price movements in 2005-08 associated with a rise in oil price uncertainty appear to be mainly the consequence of macroeconomic uncertainty, conrming the endogeneity of the oil price with respect to economic activity (i.e., the demand-driven characteristic).
Distinguishing between dierent types of shocks: the special case of oil
As stressed above, macroeconomic uncertainty contributes to a large extent to price uncertainty.
This result is of primary importance, particularly for the oil market since it shows that oil price uncertainty during the 2005-08 period can be partly explained by macroeconomic uncertainty.
Besides, the oil price uncertainty indicator (see Figure 1E in Appendix E) also reveals that the volatility of the crude oil price can be sometimes disconnected to price uncertainty, some shocks leading to uncertainty and volatility while some others not. One reason could be the origin of price shocks that can have dierent impacts on price uncertainty. Specically, four types of shocks can be distinguished (see, e.g., Kilian, 2009; and Baumeister and Peersman, 42 The lag order of the VAR specication is 3, as selected by usual information criteria.
43 Due to space constraints, we only report the results for oil and copper, two series that are strongly related to the macroeconomic context. The results for the other series, available upon request to the authors, show that the contribution of macroeconomic uncertainty to commodity price uncertainty is somewhat heterogeneous between markets.
A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
2013): (i) shocks to the ow supply of oil, (ii) shocks to the ow demand for crude oil reecting the state of the global business cycle, (iii) shocks to the speculative demand for oil stocks above the ground, and (iv) other idiosyncratic oil demand shocks. These dierent shocks may also be reected in the degree of oil price uncertainty movements. Specically, we aim here at investigating which type of shock contributes the most to oil price uncertainty.
As it is common in the literature, we proxy the ow supply in two ways: by the data on Saudi
Arabia crude oil production, and by the global crude oil productionboth series being from the Energy Information Agency (EIA). 46 Hamilton (2009) rejected the hypothesis that shifts in speculative demand were behind the sharp increase in the crude oil price in 1990. Rather, he suggested that the price increase was the consequence of oil supply shocks. More recently, Kilian and Murphy (2014) found that the oil price increase was represented by two shocks occurring simultaneously: an unexpected ow supply disruption and an unexpected increase in speculative demand.
47 Two eects on the oil price are at play during this period: a positive speculative demand shock due to the Iraq War in 2002-03, and a negative ow supply shock due to the Venezuelan crisis (see Kilian and Murphy, 2014 , for a discussion).
uncertainty. According to a popular view, this price increase was the consequence of speculative behaviors on the market (i.e., growing nancialization of oil futures markets) and could not be explained by changes in economic fundamentals (see Fattouh et al., 2013 , for a discussion).
The standard interpretation is that oil traders in spot markets buy crude oil now and store it in anticipation of higher future oil prices. On the contrary, the recent literature supports the conclusion that the surge in the oil price during this period was mainly caused by shifts in the ow demand driven by the global business cycle (see Kilian, 2009; and Kilian and Hicks, 2013) .
Our ndings corroborate this view that oil price uncertainty has been primarily driven by global macroeconomic conditions. Indeed, as shown in Figure 1G , the contribution of speculative demand to price uncertainty is very small (around 5%) compared to the proportion of the ow demand from the global business cycle in 2008 (around 40%). An alternative view regarding speculation is that OPEC held back its production by using oil below ground in anticipation of higher oil prices. As discussed by Kilian and Murphy (2014) , this behavior would be classied as a negative oil supply shock. Our results provide no evidence that such negative oil supply shocks have signicantly contributed to oil price uncertainty, contrary to demand shocks.
Finally, looking at Figure 2G in Appendix G, which reports the simultaneous contribution of each shock (ow demand, ow supply, speculative demand, and macroeconomic uncertainty)
to oil price uncertainty, we nd that the 2007-08 period of heightened oil price uncertainty is mainly the consequence of shocks coming from the global business cycle and macroeconomic uncertainty.
6 Robustness checks 6.1 Volatility-based vs. predictability-based uncertainty measure
To conrm the relevance of our predictability-based measure in the case of commodity markets, we assess the robustness of our ndings to the choice of the proxy retained for uncertainty. As stressed above, uncertainty is an abstract concept that may have dierent meanings. Indeed, according to behavioral theories, it reects a psychological state about possible futures, 48 but it is also a broad concept linked to macro or micro phenomena (like GDP growth or the growth rate of rms among others).
49 Whatever the considered denition, there is no perfect measure of uncertainty but instead a broad range of proxies. As described in Section 2, several studies have used stock market volatility as a proxy for uncertainty.
50
In an inuential paper, Bloom fewer uncertainty episodes, suggesting that variability in stock markets is much more related to volatility than to uncertainty aecting the whole economy. Therefore, comparing these two approaches allows us to compare both measures of uncertainty, namely the volatility-based and predictability-based proxies. Theoretically, each measure relies on dierent econometric concepts: the former approach approximates uncertainty by conditional volatility, while the latter requires to remove the forecastable component of the series before computing its conditional volatility. In other words, the predictability-based proxy distinguishes uncertainty in a series and its conditional volatility, while the volatility-based measure does not. As an illustrative purpose, Figure 2 
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the macroeconomic uncertainty proxy. This particularity has also been noted by Jurado et al.
(2015) regarding the response of production and employment, nding that the magnitude is larger when the shock comes from macroeconomic uncertainty at 1 month rather than from the VXO index. Moreover, macroeconomic uncertainty shocks generate a less signicant volatility overshoot in commodity prices than the VXO index (with the exception of the cotton price).
While the eect of macroeconomic uncertainty on commodity prices (especially for oil and copper prices) is more protracted (around 7 months), the response of prices after the VXO index shock is more transient (around 4 months for oil prices). This result further conrms that the macroeconomic uncertainty proxy is more persistent compared to popular volatility-based uncertainty proxies.
To complete our comparison, we follow the same procedure as in Section 5, and investigate how volatility-based uncertainty linked to the VXO index can generate commodity uncertainty. Figure 2H in Appendix H reports the evolution of commodity uncertainty for oil, gold, copper, and cotton prices for both the VXO and macroeconomic uncertainty proxies at 1 month (h = 1).
When uncertainty in commodity markets exceeds the horizontal bar, this refers to episodes of heightened uncertainty for the considered price return series. When commodity uncertainty coincides with vertical bands, it indicates that uncertainty episodes occur at the same period than macroeconomic uncertainty (green bands for the VXO-based uncertainty measure and gray bands for our macroeconomic uncertainty proxy). As shown in Figure 2H , both proxies generate quite similar commodity uncertainty dynamics. An interesting result concerns the case of the oil market for which commodity uncertainty is found to be more pronounced during the recent crisis using our retained macroeconomic uncertainty measure than with the VXObased uncertainty measure. This is in line with our previous results showing that uncertainty episodes are not necessarily accompanied by high volatility in commodity prices. Moreover, macroeconomic uncertainty rightly aects the gold market during the 1981-82 recession, a characteristic that we identify using our predictability-based measure but not with Bloom (2009)'s proxy. On the whole, these ndings illustrate the robustness of our conclusions to the retained proxy of uncertainty, and highlight the relevance of our measure in linking uncertainty to predictability rather than to volatility.
Robustness of our proxy of oil price uncertainty
An important query regarding our results in Section 5 refers to the robustness of our proxy of commodity price uncertainty. This question is of primary importance since, as discussed in the literature, 53 one reason why previous studies do not nd plausible empirical evidence of oil price uncertainty impact on GDP lies in the choice of an appropriate measure of uncertainty.
Theoretically, our approach implicitly assumes that oil price uncertainty (and commodity price uncertainty in general) is endogenous with respect to macroeconomic activity. As discussed in 53 See Kilian and Vigfusson (2011) for a discussion. Panel D: Oil price uncertainty Section 2, this debate regarding the endogenous/exogenous nature of oil prices is of primary importance since it conditions the framework used to investigate the economy-oil price nexus.
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Considering that commodity price uncertainty is endogenous with respect to macroeconomic uncertainty does not mean that exogenous eects are null or without interest, but rather that they are secondary or indirect. By constructing our proxy of uncertainty based on the global measure of Jurado et al. (2015) , we allow both the supply and demand components of the price to exist, but condition the latter to be the primary channel. With regard to this property, our measure of oil price uncertainty is thus theoretically robust, compared to those based on conditional volatility or implied volatility.
Empirically, existing proxies of oil price uncertainty have been so far either based on conditional volatility, implied or realized volatility. However, due to their backward-or forward-looking nature, it is unclear how these proxies can properly capture oil price uncertainty. To illustrate this issue, Figure 3 Finally, we nd evidence that uncertainty episodes are not necessarily accompanied by high volatility in commodity prices, highlighting the relevance of our uncertainty measure in linking uncertainty to predictability rather than to volatility.
55 Another way to compare alternative measures of oil price uncertainty is to test which approach leads to the best predictor of volatility. Alquist et al. (2013) showed that the oil futures price is of limited use in forecasting the oil price, questioning the interest of using the implied volatility to measure uncertainty. A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T 
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Highlights
 We analyze the impact of macroeconomic uncertainty on a large sample of 19 commodity markets.  The safe-haven role of precious metals is confirmed, while agricultural and industrial markets are markets are highly sensitive to the variability and the level of macroeconomic uncertainty, respectively.  The recent 2007-09 recession has generated an unprecedented episode of high uncertainty in numerous commodity markets that is not necessarily accompanied by a subsequent volatility in the corresponding prices.
